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ERRATA SHEET
r;-. please jnake the foUowing corrections on your copy of the
prosecution's pinal Brief on the Criminal Responsibility of Edmund
VSESTMiAlER, under Counts I and II (Criiies against peace), dated 3
November 194S:
On page 1, Line 15 from top: Crimes against Humanitj"
On page 9^ Line 7 from bottom: (pros* Etdi. 41> TIG—357^, D» B» 2—P*
On Page 12) Line 11 from top: (pi-os* Exh, 15j PS—212, D« B» 2, p. 6l)
On page 19, Line 15 from top: (Pros, Exh, 25o5, HG—3204^ D.B. 94^ P- 134)
On page 28, Line 10 from bottom: (Pros, Exh. 0-379^ I'IG-5S84, D. B. 20S,
P* 13)
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SSCTION A __
THE CHAEG-ES.
It is alleged under Count I of the Indictment that the
defendant Edmund VEESm'MER committed Crimes against peace in that
he participated in the initiation of invasions of other countries and
"wara of aggression in violation of international lavTS and treatiea^
including but not limited to the planning, preparation, initiation
and "waging of wars of aggression,, and wars in violation of interna
tional treaties^ agreements and assurances# The acts recognized as
Crimes against Peace are set forth in Article II of Control Council
Law No« 10»
Edmund VEESEMviAYIiE is charged under Count II of the Indictment
with participation dnring a period of years preceding 8 May
I as aleader, organizer. Instigator and accomplice In the formulation
and execution of a commcai plan and conspiracy to commit, and which
involved the commission of Crimes against Peace (including the acts
constituting War Crimes and Crimea against Huma'ty, which were cjommitt—
ed as an integral part of such Crimes against Peace) as defined by
Control Council Lav7 No# 10, and is individually responsible for his
own acts and for all acts committed by aiy persons in the execution
of such cjommon plan and conspiracy# The proof adduced relative to Counts
I, III, V, VI and VII forms a part of the said common plan and
conspiracy, and such proof is incorporated in Count XI for the
substantiation of the allegations in Count II»
VEE5EM/IAYER is charged under Count V of the Indic-tment with the
commission of War Crimes and Crimea against Humanity as defined in
Article II of Control Council Law No. 1Q in that he participated
in atrocities and offenses, including murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, Imprisonment, killiiiS hsstages,
torture, persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds
and other inhumane and criminal acts against Gerpian nationals and
members of the civilian populations of countries and territories
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Under. Ooinrc TII of the Ihdictir.ent, tTEESEB'iAZGR is charged with
the oomniission of \7ar Crimos and Oiimos t^gainst HumarJ.tyas defined in
Ai'tiole II of Oonti-ol. Council Law No.- 10 in tliat he pardjicipated in the
cnslav^enb and deportation to slave laoor on fj. gigantic, scale of
members of the civilian populations of countries and teixi-i/ories under
the beJligerent occupation of cr otherwise- controlled by the Third Reich;
enslavement- of concentration can^) J-nmates including G-erman nationals;
the use of p.riconers of wsir in operations and work having a direct
^.-elation to -..'•ar operations." and The illtreatment^ tarroriz&tion^ toi-turo
ana murder -f c-nelavod persona, including prisoners of vjar-.
Under Count VIII of the Indiotnent. VUlEOTl'iXEa Is charged with
.y
membership, subsequent to i September i?39ji In Lie Schutzstaffoln der
Nationalsoziaiistischen Leutscha.i irbf iterpertei (commonly known as
the "SS") declared to be criminal by the International Ililitary
Tribunal and paragr.'aph i (d) of Article II of Control Oounoil Law NodOo"
The criteria of crimineliCj- are set foith in Paragraph 2 of Article
II of Control Council Law No» 10, >7hich reads in part ae follcws:
"'2« Any person wi.thout ro.gerd t'.> nationality or the
capacity in which ne acted, ir deemed to liavt com
mitted a crime as defined in. ^aragrt-ph 1 of thip,
article, if he was (e.) a principal or (b) was an
aooesso:^ tc the commission of any such crime or or
dered or abetted the same or (o) took a consenting
part therein cr (d) war, connected -witn plans or entei—-
pi'lsea involving .^.ts ooinraisaion or (e) was a m^ber of
isity organ.l-safcion or group oonreoted with the cormlssion »-
-'of ary'puoh, r.rlm- or (^) ••rith re;.-eronoo to paragraph 1(&) a high political, civil or miii-..tai;y (jr.-
eluding ritaffj ro--'i'="vor. iv. or in one
of Its jr tietellir®3 or h^H,
higb position-in f-hs. trial or eoondmic
. .life oi Oiy country#" ..
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II«. CAKHER A3® POSITIONS OP RESPONSIBILITY.
"I can only give you the follo\7ing answer; I was
a National Socialist and this my philosophy I have
confirmed passionately by my devotion and my
activity
This is the frank answer which the defendant VES3M.1AYER g^ve
about his attitude in the Third Reich in his pre-trial interrogation
of August 20, 194-7 (Exhibit 174^. KG- 2905, Doc* Bk» IV B, p* 49)»
"I was being sent here and sent there, wherever
danger was in the offing."
This, was the answer which the defendant VEESM.IAXER gave regard
ing his responsibilities to that government. There were only a few men
in the diplomatic service of the Thi2rd Reich who had such a full,
active and responsible career aS- Edmund VESSEM-^AYER, who was less than
thirty when Hitler came to power and became Reich Plenipotentiary for
Hungary and SS—Brigadier General before he was foriy*
The personal data of VEESEK1>]AYER, as written down in his affidavit
(Exhibit 10, NG 1628, Doc. Blc. 1, p» 37) * gives only a pale picture of
the bold and criminal adventures he launched upon at the behest of the
Rhird Reich..
"i * Ivleniber of the National Socialist German Workers^
Party since 1932.. Party number 873 780 (?)
2. Member of the SS since 1934^ Highest ranl^:. SS-Brigade-
fuehrer since March 1944 (Honorary rank)*
3* Sxibdepartment chief of Wilhelm KEEPLER, (the
Commissioner for Bconony to the Puehrer until.
approximately 1933/ subseq,uontly engaged on the Pour
Year Plan; from Spring 1938 onwards Under Secretary^
of State for special assignments at the Foreign Office)*
^(•Engaged for obligatory service at the Berlin Foreign
Office and there again S-Ubdepartment chief to Under
Secretary of State V/ilhelm ICEP-PIER from Sept. 1939
through March 1944*
5* Political special assignments in Italy (1940)* ^
Zagreb April and May 1941; Special
Belgrade (1941),. 3n France and Spain (1942) and in
Hungaiy (1943) •-
6* German Ambassador and Plenipotentiary in Hungajry(March 1944 through Inarch 1945) •
- . "Roard of Directors and
loSn/M^gsment (Aufsichtsrat- und Ve^^s-
magnate) with the following Companies; ^HMTO &Go*(Reichsbahn); STANDARD* Berlin; Laenderba^, Vienna,
Handels- und Kreditbank, Pressburg; Boehmische
Escomptebank, Prague; Handelsbank, Cracow, and
others*
- 3 -
7at. Annual income from all activities in 1938:
approximately EB.I 8,000o—; in 19A-3i
approximately RLI 23j000»-—!»
8*. Decorations: Knight's. Gross to the Meritorious
Service Gross, with swords, October i944j
Iron Cross I and II.. class, October 194U"
Nuernberg, May i947«
Signature: Edmund VEESEM/IAYER
- 4 -
SECTION B.
COUNTS I AM) II
•• -5'
INTRODUCTION
The defendant VEJiSENf^lYERi by virtue of his high position and direct
participation, played a decisive role in execution of the foreign policy of
the Third Reich* Throughout the years of aggression he functioned as the
field general of Gorman diplomacy and assumed direction of the fifth columns
in countries ear-marked for conquest* As the Fuehrer so aptly stated on
15 March 1939^ VESSENMAYER was one of his policy-making diplomats xvho,
"staking their lives, had carried out the most drjigorous v/ork at the front"*
(pros* Exh. 125, NG-2937, D* B. 3-B, P. 333)#
The defendant VEESEMMYER was ably qualified to fulfil the vigorous
requirements of the new officialdom that played so decisive a role in the
Gennan Foreign Office under the Nazi regime, VEE3EM:tAYER was an old party
member, having joined the NSDAP in 1932 prior to the seizure of power*
(pros. Exh. 10, NG-162B, D. B. 1, P. 37)* In 1934 ho joined the SS, ajid
during the next decade ho rose to the ranlc of Bi^igadior Qonoral (sS-Brigade-
fuehror) as a result of his phonnjncnal diplomatic career, (jbid.) As his
testimony revealed, VEESENMAYER was a mainstay of the Not; Order, weaned on
the dogma of National soci^ilism and fanatically devoted to Adolf Hitler*
The evidence has clearly ost'-blishod that VEFEENMAYER roproscntcd on its
highest policy level the new blood infused by the Nazi regime into the
activities of the Foreign Office which -combined with the efforts of the old
officials to produce a vigorous and aggressive foreign policy,
VEESENMAYER*s political career had first paralleled thnt of the dofondrant
Keppler, and in subsequent years his diplomatic star even outshined that of
this all-important state Secretary for Special Assigimonts, VEESENMAYER
was continuously asaociatod with Kcpplcr from 1 April 1934^ the period that
Keppler was Plenipotentiary for Economy to the Fuehrer (pros, Exh, 2565,
NG-3004, D, B. 94, P. 1/+1); and Keppler brought his chief collaborator into
the Foroign Office when he v/as appointed state secrcta,ry for Special Assign
ments in the spring of 193S, (pros. Exli. 10, NG-1628, D. B# 1, P. 37)#
During the preparations for the Anschluss with Austria and the subsequent
•kj'* 'V-
aggressive act against Czechoslovakia in March 1939# VEESENMAYIR and Keppler
I V.
oii*
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fspearheaded the Fuehrer's diplomatie canipaigris. Under the able tutelage
of Keppler, VEESENMAYER well Icnmcd the tooloniquo of undermining sovorcign
governments, spreading sedition and creating emasculated puppet rGgimos#
The evidence hereinafter presented establishes beyond any reasonable doubt
that VEESENMAYER cooperated fully with Koppler in foimulation of policies
yjliich resulted in overthrovdng the Austrian and Czechoslovakian Oovernmonts*
Then, having won his spurs, VEESENMAYER served as Ribbcntropts personal
reproGontative, top policy'maker, and agent provocateur in Poland and in
Yugoslavia, In August 1939 VEESEMtAYER, as the top level German diplomat
at Danzig, sabotaged negotiations vath the poles, violently provoked inci
dents and sot the diplomatic stage for the aggressive v/r.r against Poland,
In April 1941 ho suddenly appeared in Yugoslavia v/horc he secured the
secession of Croatia, paving the vray for Nazi legions.
VEESENMAYER's daring execution of Hitler's foreign policy and his
fervent adherence to the ideals of the SS and the NSDAP, v/on him the imme—
diate and lasting confidence of the new Foreign Minister^ Ribbentrop, and
of the old officials who continued to hold the reins of foreign policy
firmly in their hands. As a result of tbie major diplaaatic assignments en
trusted to him by ruibbentrop, he became the .spectre of Nazi aggression. His
very appear-anco sounded a tocsin of doom for the nation that was his newest
✓
•"special assignment". In addition to the foregoing tasks, VEF.SENMJ\YER re-
✓
ceivcd important political assignments from Ribbentrop in Italy in 1940,
France and Spain in 1942, and Hungary in 1943. (pros, E>oh. 10, NM.628,
D* B. 1, p. 37). He also dealt with special missions for Ireland in Do-
combor 1942^1. 20445). In addition to his political activities, VEESEN-
IvIAYER since 1934 had boon associated with Koppler in oconondc questions.
As evidence of his diversity ^-^-nd importrnce to the Third Rcich, the follow-
ing positions which VEKSENI.ttYER hold on the Board of Directors ajid Board
of Management of those Gorman, Austrian, polish and Czech companies, among
others, partially reflects his economic activities: Sohenker h Co.;
Standard, Berlin; Laondorbank, Vienna; Commercial &Croditbajik, Bratislava;
Boehmische Excemptbank, Prague; Commoroialbanlc, Cra.cov.'. (pros, Exh, 10,
NG-1628, D. B. 1, P. 37),
VESSENMAYER rocoivod not only fame,, but iortuiio -as c. consoouenco of
-6-
•>11 -• ii^—ifii~in~ii-A -tini'i n'iltBr'>'iiari-i I'Mihil iwlniimi i i \ • I 1 i"i V iiT I'liiMiif I' f • II iJurnii
'•-V
his sterling promotion of Gorman foreign policy. Dctv;oon 1938 .and I943
his income trebled to approximately 25^000 Marks per annum, (pros. Exh,
10, NG"162S, D. Bo 1^ P«- 37)• Further, during the years of aggression hp
received continual approbation from Ribbentrop, Kppplor,^ Himmler, and Hit^or
VEESEMT-IAIlilR caji be aptly characterized'as a maker and breaker pf' govern
monts. VEE3EMI1\ZSR clearly falls vdthin the criteria of c:.-.iminality as
set forth in defining cu?Lpability for Crimes against peace in paragraph 2
of Article II, Control Council Lav.' Mo. 10, \diich rea.ds in part as follows:
"2. Any person without regard to nationality or tho
capacity in which he actod, is doomed to have committed
a crime as defined in p^iragraph 1. of tliis article^ If
he was (f) with reference to paragraph 1(a) if ho hold
a high political, civil or'military (including General
Staff) position in Gcriaajayac."
The evidence establishes that VEKSENMAYER hold not only a high civil,
but a political position in Germ-'^ riy in which he played a. key role in the
1 •
politic,al and diplomatic proparatioiis for aggressive war. In the vanguard
of Gorman diplomacy ho directly participated in*'conspiracy with other high-r
ranking govornrnontal, party and military officials in shaping successfully
✓ ✓
I,azi diplomacy. Jlis high position, we submit, is an iraportant factor to be
taken into consideration in evaluating his participa.tion in and knowledge
of tho planning, preparation, initiation and waging of aggressive wars,
declared criminal by tho nilT.
In view of the ovorwholming evidence presented against VEKSENMAYER in
proof of Counts I a.nd II of the Indictment, his failure to defend himself
against those serious charges when he took the stand boa.rs mute testimony
to his irrofuta.blo guilt. In this inst.anco tho defendant's silence spoke
volumes. As the evidence vdll hereinafter prove, no jidtigating circum
stances aro revealed to condone or alleviate the gu3.lt of this defendant.
PARTICIPATION IN GRIMKS J.GAINGT PEACE.
A, AUSTRIA.
VSESE®.t\YERls politic<al and diplomatic career daivned in late 193^ when
he began to work in closest coordination with the dofendint Kepplor in their
.ioint endeavors to undermine the sovorci.gnty of Aust,ria, Although Kopplor
had been appointed to tho Mixed Commission which vrvs to supervise the
correct crcecution of tho Ab.stro*^err.ia'n Agreojaont of 11 July 1936, ho was
-7-
siluultnncously cind clandestinely "given full authority by the Fuehrer
for the pahty in Austriatt, (pros, 15, PS-S12, D» B. 2, p, 60).
' ^ * ✓
VEESKMIAYER functioned as his deputy, (pros, Exh, 41, NG-357S, D, B. 2-A,
p, 45 and 50)4 . •
/
Kcppler and VEESEN}^AYER worked directly under the Fuehrer and -were
entrusted vath handling the Third Reich's first aggressive venture in foreig.
policy. The blue print for aggression was siinplG, The sovereignty of
Austrd.a wa.s to be undormiiied by the outlawed Austrian NSDAP, under the
political leadership of Keppler and VEESKTOV.YER, Annexation of Austria
was the final goal.
To the Austrian Nazi underground VEESENIUYER was considered an offi-
cial represont'itivG of Adolf Hitler, His close association vdth Keppler,
the undisputed top official of Nazidom in Austria as aforementioned,
suffices to establish this, ^{oreover, the fact that Yl-TSMfAVSt was so
^ regarded from the very outset is brought out in a spoodh by Gauleiter Dro
'' Friedrich Rainer on 11 March 1942, Rainor was a prominent loader of the
Austrian NSDAP from its inception. Recounting the struggle of the Nazi
party in Austria in 193^, Dr, Rainor states:
"Tliere Vfcro, to say it again, difficult discussions.
There already v;as a reproseni.ative of the Reich involved,
Gruppenfuchrer Kcppler-and his co-worker Kacscmoior *)
who wore present as the official ropresohta-tivos of the
Fuehrer," (pros, Exh, 32, PS-4005, D, B, 2, p, 1^)
(Underlining supplied).
The activities of the defendant VEESENIUYEB in Austria were in de-
fiance of Ge^i'^ianyts assurance to Austria on 21 May 1935 (Pros. F^xh, 13,
TG-26, Di B* 2, P, 55), and were in contravention of the German-Austrian
Agreement of 11 July 1936 v/hich stated in part:
"2, Ea.ch of the two Governments regards the inner po
litical order (including the question of Austrian
national socialism) obta.ining in the other country as
an interna,l aff.-dr of the other country, upon vAiich'it
will exorcise hoithcr*direct nor indirect influence,"
(pros. lipch, l/i-, TC-22, D. B. 2, p. 57),
Like Kcppler, VEESENMAYBR held official positions to cloak his real
• '^•) It is to be noted that various Austrian Nazi porsona33.ti6s often mis—
spelled VERSENITAYERts name, but the evidence clearly ostablisHes that the
defendant VEESOT-AY^IR is referred to since he is spoken of as the deputy
and co-worker of Keppler, Gauleiter Rainer rcferrod to hiia as KCpplerts
co-workor, "Kaesomoicr" (pros* Exh, 32, PS-4005, B, B, 2, p, 21), and
Captain'Lcbpcld often'referred to hiim as "Dr, Fehsomayor" (pros, ipch, 42,
NG-3282, D. B. 2-A, P, 30).
- -'r.iL • '
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activities in Austria, Ho was a member of the GQrmr.n-Aus'c,rian Intor-
Governincntal committco and nlso sorvcd on the German Gominorcial Dolcgp-tion
:.'or Gorman-Austrian economic negotiations, (pros, E:di, 2565^ NG-3004,
D« Bo 94> P- 140), Xh late June 1937> ho vnrote to General Wolff, HimmlerJs
adjutant, compressing his exclusive concern vd.th the Austrian question*
"Having alraost oxclusivoly to deal vfith Austrian ques
tions in mj'" present field of v/ork, I am very much in
terested in gaining further knowlodgo by several weeks i
leave in Au.striaoeo" (ibid,, P, 1/|.0) (Underling supplied),
' y
In cooperation with the defendant Keppler, VESSEMC/lYER maintained
constant contact with the loading pcrsonalj.tics in the Austrian movement.
He made constant trips between 1936 and 1938 to Austria to confer with
* * • y y *
leadin^: political and industrial figures, (pros. Sxii, 41j NG-3578, D.- B.
2-A, P. 42, 48 and 50), prosecution witness Theodore Rornbostol, former
chief of the political Department of the Austrian Foreign Office, affirmed
^ y
VSESEMJAIER>c frequent visits to Austria (T. 267, 279 nnd 296), and his
constant contacts with the loaders of the underground (Ts 268 and 296),
Kepplor and VEF^SEMI'tlYER faced a dual task; not only were they responsible
^or accomplishing the political downfall of the Austrian Republic, but they
wore also concerned with the elimination of dissension v/ithih the Austrian
y
NSD/iP, Captain Leopold, the radical loader of the Austrian Nazi Party,
was not amenable to placing the party under the centralized control of the
Third Reich; ho preferred to exorcise an independent position. In his
lengthy report to Hitler in October 1937^ Captain Leopold bittorly complainc<.
a.bout the undermining of his authority from ea.rly August 1937j by Kepplor
and VKEGEM.TAISR:
"I do not Icnow, my Fuehrer, if Pg« Koppler has really been
appointed to give instructions to lae concoming my con
ducting internal political affairs; our interview en the^
7 August cri in Salzburg in progonco of his Deputy, Dr,
VFESENl'iAM, was'apt to give mc this ir.iprossion." (pros,
Ml, 41, NCk-3478, D, a. 2-A, P. 48).
During this important meeting on 7 August 1937 Koppler firmly stated
in the presence of VEESEMAYER that captain Leopold wag not to interfere
In the political work being conducted by Dr, Seyss-Inqua.rt, (pros, Exli.
' ' y •
42, WG-3282, D. B. 2-A, P. 21). Germa.n political strategy had determined
that Captain Leopold, who had fallen into disgrace with Hitler because of
¥
his rash and unskilled tactics^ was to bo replaced as the loader of the
. .-9r-
fe:
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Austrian movemont by Soyss-Inquart, VEESENIMER p^irticipc.tcd in tho con-
fcrcnco of 13 August 1937 botwoon seyss-Inqnartj Kopplor, Loopold and others
Capt.-iin Leopold aptly doscribod tho purpose of this socr<;t conference ond
denonctratcd the active role of VEESEWTIMEK and Kopplcr in settling in
ternal differences in accordance with Gorman wishes:
"This conference was iiitendod to determine the attitude
of tho leadership of the nationalist opposition tov/ards
tho question of the participa.tion in the conciliation by
the National-Socialist peasantry in exchange for ado-
qua.tc concessions of the government to tho nationalist
opposition, and, furthermore, a clarification of the',
attitude tov/ards Df» Scyss-lnqunrt»" (pros. Exii. 41,
NG-3578, D. B. 2-A, p. 42).
During tho course of this stormy meeting and the discussion of the
position of Seyss-Jnquart vis-a-vis Captain Leopold for tho leadership of
the movement, it was VEEGENI.^AYIiR vdio mentioned, "after all it v/as due to
Rainer that soyss-Inquart had been entrusted with this task", (pros.
Exh. 41^ NG-3578, D. B. 2-A, P. 42),
The ovidoncG unequivocally ostvablishos that VEESEMI !i"iYER wielded
large authority and influence over the members of the Austrian Nazi j.iove-
mont and even over the country itself. Not only did he actively espouse
the candidacy, of Scyss-Iriquart in preference to Leopold, but ho placed
loading National socialists in strategic positions. Captain Loopold, in
reviev/ing tho conference of 7 August 1937 at Salzburg, Austria, also stated:
"After some palaver in which'also Dr. Fchsomaycr took
part a conference between mc, Dr, Kopplcr and Soyss v/as
convened for" tho middle of tho week between 8 and 15
August at Dr. gchaik's pladc at iTondseea Before'leaving,
Dr. Fehsemaycr informed me, that as of 1 October, tho
Jew Neumann would bo removed from the llerkur-Bank and
Dr. Fischboock would take his piece. I should try to
influence the flow of investments in this direction so^
that no dem-ago could be caused by a Jewish run'Y/ith which
request I'promiscd to comp!)^," (pros. Exh, 42, NG-3282,
D. B. 2-/., P. 30).
in a report to tho Fuehrer on 22 August 1937 Captain Leopold bitterly
conpl-^inGd thP.t VEESEM.tAYER v/aa undermining his authority and so maneuver- ^
ing the Austrian Nazi chessmen as to pave the way for tho accession of
Soyss—Inquart to the Icadorship, Leopold in part stated*
"I an being bound hand and feet, gagged and compelled
to stond by while tho wreckers of the unity of'the NSD^ .(Hitler Movement) in Austria c/^n make mischief, protected
by tho Austrian security agencies and backed by high
authorities of tho Rpich who are Ignorant of tho real
conditions out hero.
II
"Pg» Dr* VIiIBSBMI.'I/iYER, tho deputy of pg. Kopplcr, told
Hr. winackor, nanagor of tho Alpino Montan in styria
when the Ir.ttor wanted to give mo some money for the
National-Socialist movement, that he should yet vfait
a little bocauso the loadorsiiip was bejng re-organized,"
(pros, Exh» /fl, NG-357S, D, B- 2-A, p. 45) |J;Undcrlining
supplied)e
In the sane report Captq.in IiCopold later reitora-tos his protest against
VEESErj.TAYER's open and active support of tho opposition, as follows;
"lloreover, Pg, Kcpplor'is influenced to a certain de
gree by ills Deputy, pg^ Dr, VEE.SEMt\YSR who for his
part gets his informations on Austria from Df, priedl
Rainer and tho circles viio arc hostile to no, per
sonally he cannot be fa.vourably inclined towards mo
judging from a remark he made to Director vfinacker to
the effect that the latter should hold back vri-th further
remittances to'mo, as changes wore'to'bo Gxpedted,"
(Pros. Exlia U, NG--3578, D» B. 2-A^ Pa 50).
The defendant Kcpplor, during the course of his own testimony, graph
ically described VEESEM!/iYjiIR*s persuasive rolo in conncjction with tho ouster
of Captain Leopold® In part, Kepplor explained;
"Dr. VESSMIAYER then succeeded in getting Leopold to
go to Borlin, When he Was with the Fuehrer tho Fuehrer
then told him that this/ Leopold's policy had been an
insane one, l ronmbcr tha.t oxproosion very well. The
only way for him was a peaceful evolutionary way; and
Leopold obviously'" was not in a position to readjust him
self now, so tho"Fuehrer asked hiin to give up his post®"
(T. 127S7-12780)®
The early policy of tho Austrian NSD/J* under tho impetuous and po
litically foolhardy captain Leopold was patently not adequate in tho e^ras
of tho Nazi overlords. Leopold's lack of political acumen and the violent
public demonstrations of his Party vjqvo strengthening tho resistance of the
Austrian people against tho inroads of Fascism and heightening their disliko
and opposition to Nazism, '
This was a question of strategy allf^important to tho successful execu
tion of Germany's first grandloso adventure in foreign policy^ VEESENMAYER
and Kcpplor, as liitlor's personal plonipotontlarios, sav/ to it that Uie
policy of the Austrian fifth column was rapidly brouglit into conformance
with the Fuehrer's plan for effecting tho Anschluss, The plan vaas to achiovo
control by undermining the present regime ''nd infiltrating into key positions
In the government. The difficulties sucountGrod and the success of the
tactics employed is well Illustrated in a report on 6 July 1939 by Ralnor
to Oaulcdtcr Buerckcl; .
-n-
i
w
f'fAfter Kcppler was unsuccessful in the efforts to
cooperate with Leopold^ he worked together with Mr;
Reiner, Globocnik, Reinthellcr as loader of the SS,'
end Dr, Jury es deputj^-leedor of the Austrian party,
as v/oll as vdth Gleise-Horsteneu and scyss-lnquert...
"DUO to the cooperation of the above mentioned people
with group leader Keppler and other officials of the
Reich and due to the activities of other covered contact-
raon in Austria, it v/as possible to obtain the appointnont
of soyss-Inqua.rt as "Staatsra-t" (Councillor of State)
in jujy 1937o'' (pros, Exhe lA, PS—S12, D» B# 2, P, 61),
By the end of 1937 internal dissension in the Austrian novenent had been
eliminated by VEESEMYER and Keppler, and the Austrian party had become a
disciplined striking arm of the Third ReichTs poOltical loaders, (prost
iixh. 15, PS-812, D> B. 2, P. 60 .-.nd 6l).
*
The wisdom of the tactics espoused by VEESENl-iATER and Keppler were
conclusively proven when the Austrian Govoriament was coerced on 16 February
193d into admitting the Nazi puppet soyss-Inquart into the ipvornmont as
MViistcr of the Interior^ simultaneously the tottering schuschnigg Cabinet
a.nnouncod that a general political ajancsty had boon granted to cXl Austrian
s ^ ✓
Nazis, (pros. Exh. k5, PS-246A, D. B. 2-A, P. 13). With all police
agencies under the command of Scyss-Iiiquart, the stage had boon set for the
final act. '
Tv/o days later, on 18 February, VEESENIliYER rcturnod from Vienna, and
his report on the political situation in Austria was foriTardod by Keppler
to Geering on the following day. VEESEE.UYERts lengthy report cold-blood-
'odly reveals the ma.jor role that ho played in destroying the indopondence
of Austria, in part, ho relates how ho pulled the strings, and now all
that remains is to await for the puppets to danco to the tmio that Gorman
policy dictated:
"The prorApt removal of Kicnbock as president of the National
Bank sccas particularly necessary, s.lnco, as rsi outspoken
friend of the Jews, he not only toloratos the present cata
strophic policy of the Jews, but actually promotes it, ^This
opinion is confirmed even by the Austrian ninistry of Finance.
The appointment of Director Fiechbock as Counsellor of
the Federal Ministry (Bundesmlnisterium) vrc'-s made in a
whoUy unsatisfactory manner. Ho himself showed mo, on
the afternoon of 18 Fob 193S, his certificate of appoint
ment, which shows that he is to bo cnn.sulted only ^
itidividua.l cases. Since he ha.s no specif.xc a,uthority or
othcAr meaxiS of exerting influence, his appointment is
worthless for the present." (pros, Exh. 24, PS-3576,
D* B. 2, P. 95)
VEISSEWJ.YER continues, that when faced vdth a crisis duo to captain Loopoldts
r.12^
\w:
throat to resort to yiolont demonstrations before all necessary measures
had boon taken, he acted on his ovm initiative with oxtreine vigor and
political actutenessj
J'The situation of the prohibited party has reached a
crisiso Through the use of sensible intemodiarios I
succcodsd in inducing Mre Leopo'ld to leave for Germany
on 18 Fob 193B^ j«cUndbr these circumstances Lcopoldts
remaining would have been dangerous, and \action had to
be takenc On the other hand, it would ha.ve been.unbear
able for the movement had it been necessary later to re
move him forcibly to the Reich, therefore, his departure
yesterday was probally the only possible solution, as
far as the time and manner of his going arc concerned.
Our reliable people in the party -^nd the SS have received
exact instructions to'prevcnt as far as possible any
sort of demonstration) and it is to be hoped that this
can be dono»" (ibido, P. 95) (undorlixiing supplied)#
VESSENLuXYER notes that some members of the Austrian Government still
balk at becor-dng Nazi tools j
"It is to bo gathered from numerous reports that Foreign
Minister Guide Schmidt has'played a.scarcely"gratify
ing'rcle during the past fov^ days. It is he, in particu
lar, who has hindered the infiltration of nationalist
personalities into the'Government or has so v/oiikoncd their
positions,, at any rate, that no great value can bo
attached to the posts obtained to datco The motivation
of his attitude is to be found in his very strong Catholic
attachment as well as in a certain jccalousy tov/ards
Minister Soyss-Inquart#
"In the last few dr'.ys. Minister Glaiso-Horstchau has re
peatedly expressed the intention of resigning, but the
c.ombined efforts of l^inister seyss-Inquart and myself have-
succeeded, so far, in preventing him from doing this, and
there is a probability that he will rcma.in in office for
the tine being,tJ (ibid., p, 95-96),
VEESENM/iYER gives the lie to Nazi propaga-iida. by laffirming that the
• ✓
oppon;.tion from Communist circles is negligible, (Ibid,, P, 96). in
sumrikarizing the political situation, ^TEESEM.UYER concludes by recommending^
the necessary final steps to achieve the comploto decomposition of Austriai
"I^ie collapse is so botal that, provided an accelera
tion of developments fits into the Fuehrerts foreign
policy, it would bo possible to gain a number of very
inport.-.nt posts within the next few weeks'by'exerting a
corta^iii pressure from the Rolch," (ibid,, P, 95)»
IVlien Kepplor, on 11 Herch 193^^, presented the German ultimatum to
the Austrir-ji President, Mikla.s, VEESENlfAYER was again on the scone, (pros,
' ^ ^ •
Exbi, 32, PS~A005, p, p, lAl). Boering Hitler's terms of surrender,
VEESENIMYI'IR and Kepplor, by the letter's guarded admission, flow from Berlin
to Vienna on 11 March, (t. 12805). At this deoisivc moment the evidence
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cstablishcs that VEESENJUYER^ as a diplomat-of tlic Ncvr Ordot^ resumed his
SS role, Gauleiter Rainer recounts the last hours on 11 M-rch 193B:
"Klausnor, Jury and I and Kaesemeier came to the Bundes^
Chancellory, it was lockedc IVe knocked, a policeman
opcnod. Who is there? By order of Scyss we'wanted to
cntoro Question passed back - then one came, 3.od us
through somov;hcre in the rea.r and there everybody was
armed to the teotho In the .court were machine-guns.
They v/anted to prevent a now surprise attack like the
one on 25 Julyr Wc v;ore taken upstairs, up here the
situation'w.s the same as before, Soyss' shrugged his
shoulders. There is nothing cm bo done, I told about
it: In the meantime we had started the strategic con
centration of 6,000 SA-^cn etc, seyss went out to the
Bundes-prasidont .and'roported'this to him," (pros, Exh,
32, PS-4005, Ds Bo 2, p, U3)«
After president wiklas capitulated and the Seyss-Inqu.art Government
formed, Himmlcr was notified that he could now start for Austria. As a j
fitting denouement, VEESETHiVYER was at the airport "ivhon Himmler arrived,
(pros, Exh, 32, PS-4005, D. B, 2, p. 146), And VEESEl£L?fER's prompt pro-
notion to on even higher rank in the So was not by coincidence dated 12
liarch 1933- (pros, Exh, 2565, KG-3004, D- R. 94, P. 125).
l^on KGpplc3? assuraed his duties as Reich Commissioner for Austria
Immediately after the Anschluss, VEESENLt'.YER of course continued to exer
cise his dominant influonco as Kepplor*s right arm. Oh 18 Hay 1938, he
wrote:
"I am the closest collaborator of Stato Secretary SS
Grupponfuchrer Kcpplcr and at present stcationod in
Vienna. It v;ill repoa.todly bo noccssarj'" for no to make
orientation journeys especially into the ncigliboring
,countries," (ibid., P. 138). (underling supplied).
Reference is nado to the prosecution brief against the defendant
Kopplor concerning his participation in the aggressions against Austria and
Czechoslovakiao Since the evidence has conclusively established that VEESIil
ImYER "nd Kepplor closely cooperated throughout this period, that.portion
of Koppleris brief is hereby incorporated by roforencc. The evidence pre
sented against the defendant Kcpjplor completes the picture of the defendant
VEESEM'.lAYER^o activo participation.
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B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
During the period between the signing of the iiUiiich pnct end 15 M '^^ -rch
1939^ VEESEM.UYER continued to collaborr.to closely with the dofcndnnt
Kepplor, then stato Secretary for Special Assignments, in the Foreign Office
under the over-all direction of the old officials, the Reich Foreign Minis-'
tor and the Fuehrer, (pros, Exh, 10, NG-1628, D. 1; P- 37). In this
capacity VEKSENM-^YER participated as a principal in coercing Slovakia to
declare its independence on IZt ?^arch 1939 a.s a prelude to the absorption
of the remaining torso of Czechoslovakia on the following day^-
Immediately after the Miinich agreomeht on 29 September 1938, German
foreign pol.icy loid its plans- for the destruction of the independence of
the roiiifiindor of C2cchoslovald.a, This accomplishment vms to bo engineered
by the German Foreign Office under the slogan of nsclf-determination" and
"autonomyti for the various jninority groups of that country. (Fros. Exh. 98r
NG-3Q56, D. B. 3-B, P. 243(Pros. Exhc 99, NG-3241, b, B. 3-B, pi 248-
249). In repetition of-the pattern employed so succensfully in the Austrira;
and Sudetenlend questions Slovakia was to serve avS the wedge that wou].d
split asunder this weakened country'-. Under the alleged guise of supporting
the yearning of the suppressed Slovak minority for indGpcndience, Germany
fomontod the necessary provocation and cqmpolled the slovakian loa.ders to
declare the indopondonce of their country Y/hon the moment was opportune,
Nazi foreign policy dictated that the CarpathcKJkrainian minority in
Czochoslovakia was also to bo encouraged and provoked into declaring thoir
indopondonce. To counteract polish and Hungarian aspirations, it Vfas
recommondod that economic and financial support be provided in the Carpatho-
\
Ukraine to insure continued BubsGrvience of this Czech riinority group to
the foreign policy of the Third Reich. As the defendant Woermann stated
¥
on 12 Novombor 1938 in discussing this prob3.en,
"The preparatory v/ork in this connection is done by
Secretary of state Kopplor in cooperation with the
Foreign Organization and'tho "Volksdoutschc ilittelstGllQ" n(pros. Exli. 105, NG~3285, D. B. 3-B, P. 264).
Koppler in his testimony adndttod that in about November or
Dccembor 1938 Hitler discussed with him the alleged unrest in
-15-
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Slovakia and the strength of their independence movement. Hitler stated,
"The question had never "become acute before because the
position of Prague with respect to Slovakia had been too
strong; but now that the giving up of the Sudeten terri
tory meant a considerable weakening of Prague j the question
hiad again become topical. It was not a matter of temporary
unrest in Slovakia but the unrest would continue and the
efforts become ever greater." (T. 12896-12897j 20 July
1948).
Keppler guardedly admitted that the Fuehrer himself assigned
Slovakia to Keppler as the next field of operation for his special
talents.
"The Fuehrer took me aside and gave me instructions
to inform myself about Slovak matters and to keep
informed so that I might be ready at any time to be
used in tlis matter." (T- 12896, 20 July 1948).
Keppler then immediately dispatched VFSSE®'1AYFR to Slovakia,
allegedly for informational purposes (T. 12897 and 13032/033)•
shall be shown horoin below, VESSEMT^^s activity in doing the spade
work in precipitating the Slovakian crisis was far from the harmless
assignment that his co-defendant attributes to him.
In the first half of farch 1939 Nazi foreign policy dictated that
the Czech crisis bo brought to a head. Keppler himself admitted that
on 10 March Slovakian leaders were contacting German circles end that
Vienna was used as a convenient rendezvous point. (T 12901). Keppler
further testified that Gauleiter Euerckel cf Austria had contacted
the Slovakian leaders without authorization. - Hitler, highly displeased
at*this news, immediately dispatched Keppler to Vienna on 11 March to
clar-if> the matter, (T.12905). Keppler at once flew to Vienna, and
after contacting Gauleiter Buerckel and Seyss-Inquart, proceeded with
\
them to Bratislava, Slovakia, There Keppler hastily conferred with
newly appointed Prime Minister Sidor. He at once discovered that Sidor
• months of vacillation had decided to remain loyal to the Caoch
Government. (T. 12905/907).
\men asked whether he had conduct-d further negotiations in Bra
tislava alter discovering that Sidor refused to bo a tool of the
Germans before returning to Vienna he replied!
"No, I merely said that Dr. Vessonmayer should remain in
Bratislava for, from the entire situation, one could
notice that a climax would occur, and I merely gave him^
the mission to keep me informed about the events there-.
(T. 12907),
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Lgc.in Kcpplor, in his dcfonsc^ nwnotonously reitcrr.tcs thrt. his nnd
VES3Ehl^,^yERt3 function in Slovakia too ^vr.s purely nn innocuous one.
However, in r. telephone report on 12 Merch to the Foreign office, Keppler
in reviewing the situation does in novfiso refer to Goulcitqr Buerckol's
supposed unauthorized denlings but rnther lojnents thrt ho hod boon duped
•by sidor. In svunmr.tion he stated.
"At .present there vms cclni in Bratislava, it vfould
bo rather difficult to j ind new starbifig points."
(Pros. Kxh. 117, NG-30A'", D. B. 3-B, P. 315).
But VESSEMI/xYER, as t;111-be si bsc^uently shown, did clear the affair up
speedily and find the necossarj'" nethod of foicing the slovakian loaders
to comply with the Gorman dema-ndn.
During his many months in B'.-atislava., VEiSEK.U.YER maintained close
contact with the Slovak dissident leaders and was a party to their
innermost councils, Gorruan Conso?. Goncral von Druffcl, in reporting to
the Foreign Office from Bratislava on 10 Harch. about the ticklish but
politically decisive quest*'on—^vhother Tiso cou.d be coorc ,d into a
declaration of independence and an appeal for pi'otection—stated;
"FESSEMt'.TER declared; fiso v/ho had originally
given his consent by word of mouth, and later
refused to sign, had then empowered Du!?cajislci also
to act in his name." (pros. Bxh. 352$. NG-5356, '
D« B. 97-A, P. 97). . '
Keppler even disavov/od participation by VEESEIftUYER or himself "in
getting ExH.:lnister president Tiso to como to BorAln for the fatal con
ference of 13 March 1939 with tlitler. However, ho did state that
coincidcnta.lly, "Dr. VEESEJIt.tiYSR a.ccoinpanied Tiso to the a.irport in
Bratislava", (T. 12910) ^
This weak and self-serving declaration is in stark contrast to tho
•^.ctual circumstances. In Kepplcr^s letter to Himix.or on 11 July 1939
the true nature of VEESENliirEH's and Kcpplerts actr.vity is revealed;
"These negdtiations had, naturally, not '.ho'desirod
result and, duo only particularly good luck, it y^.s
possible to save tho confused situation a.nd to bring
prime Minister Dr. Tiso in time to a conforonco '.dth .
the, Fuehrer to jdrlin." (pros, Exh. 119,'NG-29^^^J
D- B. 2-A, p. 88). (underlining supplied).
-17-
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fIn this connection the evidence by Keppler^s ovin admission
established that it was WSSEWAYZYi who remained behind in Bratislava
to conduct the necessary on-the-spot negotiations* After Tiso met
Hitler on 13 March 1939 in the presence of Keppler and was compelled
to declare the independence of Slovakia or face the danger of an in-
\
vasion by Hungarian armies (Pros. Exh, 120, FS-2802, D. B, 3-?j
322-32/i), he returned to Bratislava. With operating behind'
the scenes the Slovak Parliamant declared its independence on 14- March
on
(Pros. E3Kh. 118, NG-3956, D. B. 3-B, P. 31'4-A), and/l6 March issued the
stereotyped request for protection (T. 12918).
Portions of the testimony of Keppler have been discussed herein
only insofar as they relate to the defendant VEESEM'AYIP. Since
neither by oral nor documentary testimony has VBSSEM'ArCR denied
participation in the Slovak question, the testimony of his co-dofon-
' dant has been discussed merely to complete the picture. As part and
parcel in proclaiming his ovm innocence, Keppler reiterated that
VESSEMIIAYER's role too was a harmless one, that of securing infor
mation. Yet on the very day that Gorman troops relied into Czochos-
lavakia Keppler contacted Himmler and reminded him of a previous con
versation of a few days ago, "about the extrordihary difficulties
that had to be overcome in carrying out the task assigned to the SS
on the occasion of the anschluss of Czochcslovakia", (Pros. Exh.
125, NG-2937, D. B. 3-B, P. 333)# Unfortimatoly, Kuppler continues,
serious complaints were made even to Hitler against the tactics employ
ed by V^SSEMlvAYSR in overcoming these difficulties,
"For my part, I naturally tried to contact Ribbontrop
and the Fuehrer in order to repel the attacks, and
due to Ribl-entrop's help, I definitely hope that the
Fuehrer no longer has any doubts as to the justifica
tion of the complaints.
"When, last night, after the conclusion of the agreement,
WG wore together with the Fuehrer, the FuehrOr remembered
particularly the men who staking their liv-jSj
had carried out the most dangerous work at the-front.
Thereupon Ribbentrop stated that the whole of this work
had been done in an exemplary manner exclusively by the
SS, particularly Dr. VESSEHM&YER and Gootsch." (Pros.
Exh. 125, NG-2937, D. B. 3-B, P. 333).(underHdnlng si^plied)
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Keppler thon strongly recoriinended to Himlor that V^ESENI'.L'.YSR be
promoted from Colonel in the 33 to n higher ronlc for his sterling role
in effecting foreign policy .by overcoming p.ll obstacles thot threetened
to stp.n jjnzi plr.ns for r.ggression, (pros. Exh, 125, NCr-2937, D. B.
3-B, P. 333).
Himmler's reply on 28 llorch 1939 to Keppler voiced his epprociotion
of VEESEKI.L'iTERIs outstanding v;ork but expressed the belief that the time
vm.s not yet opportune to promote VEESEm^.IER to the rank of Qberfuehrer
(senior Colonel, SS). (pros. Exh, 125, NG-2937, D. B- 3-B, P. 333).
Keppler again on 23 January 1942 reconmended VEESEMu.YER for pro
motion,
"Since pr, VEESEMI'.l/LyER by his constant preparedness
and tenaxity did outstanding service when the march
into Boheiiia and Slovakia was being prepared," (pros.
Exh. 3265, NG-3004, D. B. 94, P. 134).
Seven days later VEESEMI/iYER was so promoted by Hinmiler. (pros. Exh,
Ij' 2565, ;^3004, D. E. 94, p. 125).
Keppler, in referring to these exhibits in his direct testimony
and naturally desirous of protecting his closest collaborator and personal
^ \
friend, stated that he had exaggerated VEESEMlilYER^ s accomplishments in
order to secure his promotion, (T. 12923/924). .such modest a.ppraisa.l,
ef VEESENl/lAYER^s accomplishments in Slovakia does not measure up to sS
Gruppenfuehrer Wolff ts independent judgment of VEESE['ni.^iYER^s role, but
reaffirms the evidence presented against VEESENIIAYER londor this speci-
fication, Wolff on 11 September 1939 wrote to the defendant Koerner, and
in part, stated as follows:
"SS-Standartcnfuohror VEESEMIAYER, due to his posi
tion of collaborator of state secretary SS—Gruppen
fuehrer Keppler, took as is vfell Imown, a specially
prominent part in the operation resulting in the
reunion of Austria and of the Sudetendistrict and in
the incorporation of the Protectorate .and of'Slovakia."(pros. Exh. 2565, NG~3004, D- B. 94, P. 135).
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VEESENI-.Ii'.YER' s particlprttion in the diplomatic preparations for the
invasion of Poland narked a turning point, in his ca.rccr. As a result
of his outstanding services in association vfith the defendant Kcpplcr ^ •
in the Austrian and Slovakian a.ffairs, VEESENiuiYER had vron the full con-
fidence of the Foreign Office hierarchy, (Pros. Bxli. 125, MG-2937,
D» B.. 3-B, P. 333).» Henceforth VEESEMl'.IHR worked alone as the personal
representative of the Fercign Minister and the Fuehrer. (T. 1292S).
✓
^ VEESEMfiTER had won his spurs under fire, and starting with the polish cam
paign he was entrusted with the responsibility of bringing diplomatic
qanpaigns to a climroc and providing the pseudo-justification for the wars
of aggression so dear to the hearts of the Nazi loa.dcrs.
During pre-trial interrogation VEISSEMiiYER froel^'^ admitted that
Eepplcr had rocooaended him for the mission to Da.nzig. (pros. Exh. 174,
p NG-2905, D. E- 4-Bj p. 61). During his direct testimony Kcpplcr himself
^ recounted the details. In mid-August 1939 Ribbentrop telephoned Keppler
and inquired whether. VEESENIL'dfER was "the sort of person ho could send to
Danzig to get infomation". When Keppler in flowing terms reassured him,
%
Ribbentrop at once sent VEESEM'l/'^ YER. (T- 12928).
When VEESEI®IAIER arrived in Dajizig in the middle of August 1939
(VcosGnmaycr Exh, 51, Doc. 232, Vcesonmayor D. B- 3, P. 47), the Danzig
question v;as a burning one. For the past" few months German foreign policy
had been agitating the Danzig problem in order to provide one of the pre-
* texts necessary for Hitlerts attack on Danzig. The cyos of the world
were fisod on Danzig. The policy of the German Foreign Office v/as to so
regulate the treatment of the Danzig question as ostensibly to place the
blame on the polos for the failure of poacoful negotiations and permit
the annexation of Danzig, (pros. Exh. I67, NG-2379, D. B» 4-B, ?• 30)«
Nazi foreign policy necessitated that the '^ctions of president
Greiser of the Danzig gonate and Ga.uleitcr Forstor be so controlled as
to dovetail into the over-all policy being employed. VEESENI YiYER '''^ as
dispatched to represent at the highest level the interests of the German
Foreign Office and to insure that the course of action adopted in Danzig
adhered to the political and dlploraatic plan. 0^^ 19 August VEESEKM/iYER
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Iinformed the defcndrrit v/oizsnGCker of the proposed political mea.suros to
be employed in negotiations with the poles over the acrimonious Danzig
customs dispute., (it is to be noted that" the defendant l7oizsacckor was.
in charge of the Foreign Office between 19 and 2k August 1939 while Ribben-
trop busied himself with the Russian pact negotiations.) "VEESEMtLMER
stated:
"Gaialoitcr Forster urgently requested me to ask
whether the R/ll (Reich liinister for Foreign Affairs)
would approves Increasing pressure against Poland
to the l3jnit» On account of the talks held on the
18th about the question of the customs'officials it
seems that Poland is prepared to 3m.eld. Poland is
willing to withdraxv about 12 of the customs officials
concerned within 8 to 14 daysc Further discussions
on this matter between Greiser and the polos arc not
provided for. ...Gauleiter Forster intends to extend
clair:is through his representative to about 50 polish
customs official and their immediate vd.thdra.T;al,
Should the polos yield again, it is intended to in
crease the'cla.ins fiirther, in'order to'mr.ko accord
ImpossiblOo" (pros. Exh. 173^ NG—2172, D. B* 4—
p. 48).(underlining supplied).
Wcizsaecker »s reply on 19 August demonstrated tha.t the proposed plan
was at least in part a product of VEESEMu.YER*s cooperation, ii/eizsaecker
reminded VEESENl'f.YER that it was his tadc to insure that the negotiations
wore conducted in such a fashion that in accordance with Nazi policy all
blame must be thrust upon Poland; ho stated,
"I agree with your idea about how to conduct"dis
cussions about the customs officials dispute. Still,
discussions vdll have to be conducted and pressure
exerted against Poland in such a v/a.y that responsi
bility for faj.larc to come to an agrooment and the
consequencds rests'with polandT" (pros. Exh, 173^
NG-2172, D. Ba 4-Bj P. 48).(underlining supplied)..
On 22 August VEESEMII/tYER's reply to Vfoizsaocker unveiled the concrete
measures to provoke V7a,r ;vith Poland mder all circumstances.. This un—
para.lloled blue print of Nazi duplicity speaks for itself:
"Action is planned as follov/s:
I
"1, Long-drawn negotiations in the question of
customs officials will end in a complcto deadlock,
polos to bo blamed for it,
"2, Complete removal of all polish custom
cials and abolishing of the customs-frontier bo
East Prussia will follow,
"3. The poles will react, one way or the other.
"4. Wo shall retaliate with tho arrest of numerous
polos in tho Danzig area and seize nmorous Pol^s
hidden stocks of arms. The finding of those hx on
arms is secured,
-21-
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"5« 'If the poles do not sufficiently rcrct to
this, "then finally the :?GstOrnplr.tto'shrill"be '
attacked,"' (pros, Exh, 175, HG—3615, D. B. 4-3,
p, 69) (underlinins supplied).
It is evident that VEESE^FiflYER^s plan was predicated upon r/oizsaecker's
recommendation that the ncGotiations be so conducted viith ever increasing
pressure that the polish representatives vfould find it impossible to
acquiesce, Vfar could be the only outcome, "VEE^EMlAlffiR trds fulfilling
his role v/ith his usual combination of astute diplomacy and premeditated
violence,
VSESM-uiYER also stated that Gauleiter porstor v/as conferring id.th
the Fuehrer to secure final approval before sotting the operation in
motion. (Ibid.), Shortly, thereafter, on 24 August, VEBSEMIAYER notified
Weiasaockor that Hitler ha4 approved of points One, T^7o, Three and Five,
(pros, Exh, 176, NG—1993, D. B. 4—B, P» 70)*
on 25 August VEESEMIiiYEH tclographod the Fuehrer and requested that
Ribbentrop.also be informed of certain inquiries of Gauleiter Forster.
VEESEIttMER queried,
I'l) ^•JhGthov on D-Day (stichtag) the High Commissioner
may be informed that his mission is terminated and
whether his house nay bo confiscated subsequently.
"2) Whether the sajnc measures may bo taken with
regard to the president of the polish Harbor Comm
ittee,
"3). Whether, and in v&ilch matter, Gauleiter porster .
is to take measures for the imnodia.tc evacuation of
the two'aforonamed'gontloncn," (pros, Exh, 177,
NG-2374, D. B. 4-B, p. 71).
This tclQgrajn is highly- instructive, it reaffirms the foregoing
evidence that VEESETEl^YER was working hand end glove with Gauloitor por
ster as well as other leading fl^.ures in Danzig in mo.pping out"the
necessary campaign. It also establishes the importance of VEESmi/^.YER's
position for ho possessed the unprecedented authority to comnunlct.te
directly vdth Adolf Hitler to vhon he was already well Icnown^for his ex
ploits in Austria and in Slovakia, (pros, Exh. 125, NC—2937, D* B« 3-B,
P. 333)* VEESENHAIER speaks vdth certainty of "D-Day", proving his un
equivocal familiarity with the certainty of the German attackj the out
break of which his action was insuring.
Although VEESEKI.l'.YIiR refused to testify on the polish question, two
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1affidavits v/oro subniittod in his behalf (VcGscnnayor Exh, 50, Doc* 74,
^ - • * • *
p. 45, and VoGSGrunayer Exh.' 51/ Doc, 232, Vocsonnayor D. B» 3, P. 47-4S),
iJiGse may be suiamarily dealt vdth. It is to bo noted that both affiants
are still in custody and as fornicr noobcrs of the Nozi Party and state
Adninistration of DanziG,| cooporatod fully rdth the defendant in his
Dansic mission, Virtuadly in the sane lajiruage, both affidavits reiterate
the saiio story: VSSSEKIUYER occupied the innocuous role of an intelli-
goncG and infornation co-thoring officer of the Foroicn Office. :siy effecte-
noss of those tv;o affidavits is foolhardily destroyed by their respective
concluding pa.ra.graphs in which they state that Gauleiter porster, VEESEW—
" ^ ^
HiiYER and the other Danzig ninions, including themselves, never thought
tha.t a war viovdd result from this "more diplomatic maneuver of a war of
nerves". (Ibid., Exh, 51, P* 47)•
The evidence hcreinabove presented proves beyond any reasonable doubt
that VEESEMIi"."ffiRTs position was far from the informa.tion function that ho
also adopted as a mute defense on the Austrian and Slovakian questions,
VEESEM.I/vYER himself grudgingly admitted that ho served as the mediator of
the Foreign Office in Danzig (pros. Exh, 174, NG-2905, D, B» 4-B, P* ^2),
and himself aptly described the heroic stature he assumed in the diplo
matic picture rdion ho said:
"If there was a fire'anywhere, I was sent," (pros,
Exh, 174, NO-2905, D, B, 4-B, P. 6I),
.A' .
D. YUGOSLWIA.
The diploniatic and political preparations prior to the aggressions
against the Scandinavian and Countries did not require VEESEMiVZSR'S
specialised talents, No oppressed minorities existed In these countries to
appeal to the German Reich for benevolent protection. -HoYTever,
viho ncvi vras devoting his full time to the German Foreign Office (Veesenmayer
Exh. 73, Doc. 210, Veesenmayer D. B. 3, P- 117), did execute a special-
assignment in Italy in 1940. (Pros. Exh. 10, NG—1628, D,B. 1, P. 37).
'^lien preparations for the assault on Greece were interrupted in Tarch
1941 by the overthrovr of those Yugoslavian governmental leaders who had
signed the Tripartite Pact, VEISENI'^ YER's unique diplomatic abiUties were
again in demand. On 27 T^arch 1941 an infuriated Hitler suddenly announced
in the presence of Ribbentrop that Yugoslavia too vras to be earmarked for
conquest. (Pros. Exh. 302, 1746-PS, D. B. 7-B, P. 41-B). German foreign
policy was thus given little time to stage the necessary pretexts which
Hitler so dearly desired. Banking upon the time-proven formula for aggression
that had been employed so effectively in the Austrian, Czech, and Polish
solutions, German foreign policy dictated that the secession of Croatia was
to be immediately forced. VE1SEM!-iYIH, who had long since ceased to operate
under Keppler's wing, was immediately summoned to Rib' entrop and informed of
the purpose of his trip to Yugoslavia. (Veesenmayer Exh. 73, Doc. 210,
Veesenmayer D. B. 3, P- 117-118). The evidence has clearly established that
VEESEMiiYER was well aware of the purpose of his mission and as shown herein-
helow', effectively executed it. It can he reasonably inferred that during
the course of this conversation vdth Ribbentrop he must have been informed
of Hitler.3 decision to wage war on Yugoslavia. The evidence reveals beyond
any reasonable doubt that he was aware of this decision at least prior to the
outbreak of hostilities on 6 \pril^l941-
on 1April lS4l', von Rintclen, of Ribbentrop. s personal staff, infornod
the German Consul General, Freund', in Zagreb, Croatia (the Gornnns referred
to this city as igram)', of VECSEirim's imndnent departure and mission:
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"Herr j'alletke from Rcichsleiter Rosenberg's office, and
SS -Standartenfuehrer Veesenmayer are leaving here today
with the object of sounding ^authoritative Cjc^t personal
ities and will call on you. Both have instructions to
exert their influence on the lines of the telegrams
dispatched to you ^^esterday." (pros. Exh. 317j NG^3260,
B. B. 7-B, P. 86), (Underlining supplied)
Thus, even in this caTefully worded telegram is revealed the object of
VJC'ESSNI'lyER's mission. Ribbentropis previous instruction^^ 4^ part, are
disclosed by his telegram on 1 April 1941 to Zagreb, in which he directed
«»
that Dr. lacek, Croat Vice-president of the Yugoslav Government, bo advised
as folloy/s:
mfe would strongly advise him and the other Croat Leaders
not to cooperate in any v:ay T/ith the present Belgrade
Government, The fact of our giving such advice must naturally
be treated as strictly secret. Should he follow our advice,
we would wish to remain in touch vdth liim. He v;ould have to
malce communication secure on his side by means of suitable
intermediaries." (ibid, P. 85).
Referring again to von Rintelon's above mentioned telegram, Ribbentrop
removed any possibility of misinterpretation of the loading role to be
played by VEESEM'in the negotiations:
"The Reich Tinister for Foreign .Affairs requests you to
inform the Croat personalities in question in a suitable
fashion, that Korr Veesonmaver can b'o considered as the
Vortrauensporsen (confidential. qgGnt_)_ of the Reich" rinister
for Foreign .Iffairs," (Underlining supplied) (ibid', P. 86).
On 3 April 1941 Consul General Freund informed the Foreign Office that
VEESEMI''^ YER had arrived at Zagreb, (Pros. Exh. 31E^j NG-3247j D. B. 7-3,
P. 87), In this telegram Freund stressed the necessity of a prompt leaflet
$ campaign to spur the Croats to action. Ho also revealed that although
Belgrade did accede to Dr. ?'acGk's demands, "efforts vail be made to spur
racek on to further demands", (pros, Exh, 313, NG-3247j D. B, 7-B, P. 37).
(I He concludes that reference vdll be made to tho contrast betv/eon the Croat
and Serbian peoples and the Croats "will be assured of German sympathy and
understanding of their interests, (ibid, P. 87).
It is notevforthy that on tho day preceding VESSENI'MER' s arrival,
Ribbentrop ordered the closing of the Gorman Legation and all Gorman consul
ates in Yugoslavia with the exception of the consulate at Zagreb. (Pros,
Exh. 319> NG-3243, D, B. 7-B, P. 88), Thus, VESSEL''i.YER was not only
✓
Ribbentrop's personal plenipotentiary, but also tho only active German
I
diplomat in Yugoslavia at this critical stage,
- I ir'f'r^riT^ifrrtnKiii-Hafc-T-f
* f'M
f,,i
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VE'^ E?'r''AY^ in exortin,^ pressure upon the Cront leaders was following,
the pattern of cajoling and coercion employed so effectively in the solution
of the Slovakian impasse in ''"arch 1939* Clothed mth full authority to act
in the name of the Foreign Minister, VESSEI'^ I•IYER spoediiy brought the Croat
question to a satisfactory conclusion. On 5 April 19A1 he sent a telegram
from Zagreb to the Foreign Office through Consul General Freund. WSE^h
¥AYm announced that on 31 Karch the Croatian leaders had convened and
declared their independence. The close cultural, political and economic
V ^ *
ties vdth Germany were, of oourso, stressed, and recognition of the new
government by the .Ixis powers was requested. (Pros. Exh. 325, ir.-3126,
D. B. 7-B, P. 100).
VES"iEMIl'i'ER's by now ancient diplomatic appeal was incorporated in the
V
resolution of the Croat loaders.
"In order to protect the independence of the newly createdCroatian State, the representatives of the Croatian people
ask the German Reich Government in the na.mc of the whole
Croatian people for irrmcdiato protection and aid."
(Ibid, P. 101).
Thus vrcll ^vithin the deadline foi; the military attack VEESE[r\Ym had
succeeded in securing the active participation of the Croats in the destruc
tion of the Yugoslav State. Their appeal for protection furnished the
necessary Nas^i justification for the invasion. It was promftly answered by
the Luftwaffe r&zing Belgrade on the follovdng day, 6 .\prxl. ^
Still acting on his ovm authority under Ribbentrop's aegis, VE1SE»-
I-yER ronmned at Zagreb to direct the formation of the puppet Croatian
Gcvernment that ho, had fostered. On 11 April VEESEN '^AYEH called Ribbon-
trop, informing him of amessage of the provisional head of the Croat
Government', Dr. Kvaternik, for iMnodiato trra^smission to Hitler.
Kvatcrnik expressed the gratitude of the Croat people for their liberation
and protection by the German -ehrmactt and requests recognition of the
now state of Croatia, (Pros. Exh. C-374, NG-5306, D, S.
VFJ^Eir'YEP^ concludes by describing tho vital role he pla^.cd on hi
initiative in bringing this state of affairs about.
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"The devGlopHLent duri^_thc_last fey; da_^s_has_necossiiatod
m;y_int£ryontion< I shall submit a detaj.lod report as soon
as coded telegrams ca.n be sent .again. Request urgent
instructions concerning future attitude. T'oanwhilo I sh^.ll
support Kvatornik," (Underlining supplied) (Pros. Exh,
G-374, NG-5306, D. B. 20S, P, 3).
1 further report sent by VEESEN '^VfdR on 11 April to Ribbentrop from
Zagreb detailed his active direction of the political course of events in
Croatia. (Pros. Eb:h. 0-334, NG-5375, D- B. 203, P. 21). Only the first
page of this telegram has been discovered, end VEESEMTVIEE's signature is
absent. Hoivever, the authenticity and authorship of this telegram is
unquestionable.' This document was found in the defendant Treizsaockcr's
files, and the standard Foreign Office distribution list of sealed matter
telegrams appears thereon, (ibid, P. 22). By oven cursory examination of
the exchange of telegrams between VEESEtf'IYER and Ribbentrop, particularly
with reference to Pros. Hch. Ct374 (supra) VEESEJI?"\YIR's authorship is
clearly established. Further, no Ocrman official at Zagreb at this
critical moment except VESSEI '^AYER could ha.ve sent, such a tclcgrajn to
Ribbentrop. Even this portion of the full report reveals that VEiiiSEN? AYER
-personally directed the .execution of Gorman foreign policy in Croatia and
so implemented the aggression against Yugoslavia:
"Since, hoi^evor, the situation had become threatening in
the meantime, T had to_act_on order
to prevent at all costs a proclamation by :h.cok, which
would have involved the most sorioi.is interior conflicts
and bloodshed. ...I therefore on_10 April tookjihe
initiative, arranged a discussion with Kvatornik, and
BP-T-l
over of ^owor. I i?,sked him to sot up a state of highest
alert.
"Until yesterday I anxiously waiting for the dropping
of pamphlets. This, hovjevcr, did not hr.ppon so that until
today not a single pamphlet was dropped over Zagreb,
The dropping of pamphlets would have boon a sign for mc
that German troops vjorc approaching, and thus would have
enabled mc to dotcrmino yie bGst_moment for
acUonJi (Ibid., P. 2l7 (underlining supplied).
No Nazi diplonvatic plenipotentiary over manipulated the leadership
of a satellite country more faciloly than ^/EES'\'!CR did. On 12 April
1941 VEFOT.]T-Vra informed Ribbentrop of further political decisions tha.t
ho had t.aken:
"Definite formation of government has been postponed
until the recognition of an indcpondont'Croatia, by .the
4 Axis powers, as hoped for by the Croats, takes place.
'M
v.r.
4r
"A time limit should be'set for the mainteaince of the^
provisional arrangement^ since otherwise the ncv; Croatian
government'would lose'in an increasing degree." (Pros*
Exh. C-375, D. 20S, NG-5300, P. 4-5).
VEESENi'^ .^YER. also reported that the formation of a puppet government
IS proceeding favorably. His remarks enibody elements of ironic humori
"Governing Council as basis for future Croat people's
government with Kvaternik as president in process of ,
being set up. Guaranteed_to include orayjDost £eoplc_j_"(Pros. Exh, C-376, NG-5277, D. B. 203^ P. 57 Tunderlining
supp]j-ed),
Ribbcntrop, on 12 April, voiced his complete approval of the methods
•dopted by VEESEB[4YER and stated that the Italians vrould nov; take a hand
.n the handling of the Croat question. He advised.
"Please continue inconspicuously to keep close to Kvaternik,
but keep back find'leave all further measures to the Croats."
(Pros, Exh. C-377, NG-5278, D. B. 208, P. 8).
VEESEI®iiXER, on 13 April, informed the Foreign liinister that the first
leeting of the Croatian provisional council had taken place and voiced their
adherence to the principles of national socipaism. VEESEMMYER further
states that the exiled Croat leader, Pavelic (referred to occasionaUy in
German communications as Pawelitsch and Pavelitsch) was already on his we.y
to Zagreb. (Pros, Exh. C-378j NCi-5241, D. B, 203, P, 10),
Ribbentrop immediately answered on 13 April that Germany xntendod to
recognize Croatia at once, under the leadership of Favclic. VEESENIiAlER
was to reply with the coded word "Pavelic" when evcr,^d>hing was in order,
(-ros. Exh. C-379, NG-5844, D. B. 208, P. 13). An attr.ched draft of this
tolcgr,ani reveals in more detail what VEESENIIAIER's task was to bo. Although
,.p to this date Kvaternik had been acting as head of the provisional govern
ment, VEESENHA"n3R was not only to secure his resignation hut also to i
that he would subordinate himself to the new leadci, p,.volic, (I ' >
'.-athin the 24.hour deadline, VEESEMMAYHl's terse reply on Ik April
indicated the prompt success of his intervention:
"Password 'Po-velitsch'. Discussion 21 hours. Every
thing completely clear." (Pros, Exh, 0—3^0, NG-527 f
D. B. 208, P, 14).
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VEESEWAYER rgcSn on 14 April Informed tho Foreign Panistcr of his
course of action. Ho nnnouncod that "within 15 mnutos of his arrival a
conference occurred between Pavalic^ Kvp.ternik and VEElEN^iAyEEli Pavolic
affirmed his close allegiance to the policies of the Third Reich and
entrusted tho Germans with tho handling of Croatian foreign policy,
(Pros. Exh. C-381, NG-"5269, D. B. 203, P. 15-16). VEEOEWHYER stated,
"So far I was able to establish that Kvatornik enjoys
Pavolich' complete confidence and that there is agree
ment on every point. ,Kvaternikts unconditional sub
ordination to pavclich' leadership i3_rjn£tter £fl,courso,"(Ibid^ P. 15) (underlining supplied).
VEESENPAXER then concludes with certain recommendations to Ribbcntrop
and Hitler as to the political lino th-it he considers most expedient,
"His person forms the guarantee that ho will in no way
r disappoint tho Fuehrer. I shoiJldJ:.herGforej'/arml;^ roc^
that ho be received by tho Fuehrer and Reich Foreign Ministcr
as soon as Croatia is recognized by the Reich.
"Croatia's recognition todtay v.'ould coincide with Pavolich'J march into Zagreb and would thus be pnrticTilarly effccti-yo,
' especially as tho increasing a.ppoarancc of the Italians is
giving rise to concern." (Ibid., P. l6). (underlining
supplied).
4
Pavelic, on 15 April, through VSEeEME/tATiiR., informs Hitlvsr of tho
gratitude of the Croatian people for the action of Germany in recognizing
the so-called independence of Croatia. (Pros. Exh. 0-3^2, NG-5203, B.
✓
208, P. 17)-. On tho follovdng day Ribbcntrop Informs VFEvSENdiXER that ho
should induce the Croatian Govornment to request rocogiiition from other
Gcriman satellites, n.-^mely, Hun,g^ry, Sulgaria, Ritmania, etc, (Pros. E-li.
✓ '
C-383, HG-5235, D. B. 208, P. 19).
In tho face of tho above-mentioned dame.ging and uncontcstod tootimony
of his role as tho top level diplomatic policy-nvler in Tugosl-a-vn..-,
VEESEM15ATER's sole defonso was one affidavit which can be simimarily
missod. Th;. afilr:nt served as VEESEffifATER' s personal soorctai'y from
November 194^^ unti], the end of tho "vvar, and her natural picjudic<-
of the defendant is quite evident. Her testimony is quit.- illumi • *g
since, in addition to general denial of VEESEN5i''iXEH's guilt, she
additional cvidonco of his culpability. By her own adroission she
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•in Berlin pjicI out of contp.ct with Vj!^3EN]"iA"'fj^R between the end of I'nrch
1941 and 20 April 1941. Therefore, her testimony has no relevancy
whatsoever in connoction with VEESEMATpR's role in Yugoslavia bctvjccn
¥ *
the end of Itarch ani 20 April 1941. She docs-state, however, that after
20 April she remr^incd for several weeks witl) VEESEmilYER in Zagreb and
that his functions were tlion of an advisory nature. This buttresses
^ *
prosecution Exhibit 10 (NG—162^, D. B. 1, P. 37) that VEESEMiAYER
remained in Croatia up tlirough May 1941. Even at this late date ho
continued to insure that the Croatian State operated under his guidance
^ accordance wibh German v/ishos.
It is noteworthy that VEESENJiAYER even in the succeeding years
remained in contact with Croatian political affaii's. On 23 February 1942
ho participated in a conference at Zagreb of various diplorrkatic and
^litary leaders of the Southeast. (Pros. Exh. 332, wrT-29B6, D. B. 7-B,
p. 113). Anti-partisan measures were discussed and the degree of
cooperation to be effected between Croatia and Italy. AHilESEtfLAYER
oven was oonoorned with policies of the Hedic regime, a puppet govcrn.ment
established in the Serbian portion of conquered Yugoslavia:
"6.) Dr. Veoscnmayor stressed essential £olitical
measures. These arc necessary to prop up the Ncdicio^orr^ont: Speeding up of the dischrxgo from Gorma:.
Ccamps of 100 prisoners of war already offici. lly^
released. The Corai'nander-in-Chicf Southeast promxses
his immediate support that the talks^bcgm be-woen
the Popl-^vnik and Ncdic will bo continued through the
old intermodiarics; reliable P'^ ^sonalitics vail ^onTput in charge of these taEcs, if Office agr^s.
On this verbal reports will be nr.do.' (ibid, P. 114}.
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